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1.1 A Potted Review
Humans live in material intercourse with both nature and each other to sustain life.
These arrangements, which broadly fall under the notion of ‘economics’, have not
always bankrupted nature. The long hunter-gatherer phase of human existence, in
general, left a small ecological footprint. Nevertheless, many civilizations and even
smaller-scale societies have destroyed their ecosystems through loss of topsoil,
extinction of over-exploited species or failure of overly elaborate and inflexible
arrangements; for example, dependence on complex irrigation systems that fail
when drought strikes.1 The rise of fossil-fuel based economies, originating in the
West in the 19th century and expanded globally by the late 20th, has produced a
rise in living standards and population that is unprecedented, but that rise is now
hitting ecological limits. How have Western ideas of economics dovetailed with this
economic dynamism and ecological destruction? What can be gained by going back
to models that, in terms of their human balance in nature, and perhaps their bal-
anced relations among people as well, were more successful? In this chapter, and in
this analysis as a whole, we will address these questions.
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When Adam Smith,2 James Mill,3 David Ricardo4 and other intellectuals of the
18th and 19th centuries ﬁrst described the foundations of the free market system,
they gave us an account of how the economic machinery that had come into being
as a consequence of the Enlightenment and the emerging democratic forms of
government constituted around notions of human rights to life, liberty, property and
equality, represented the liberation of mankind from the tyranny of kings and
priests. In a free market, each individual makes choices by allocating their own
resources as they see ﬁt, voting in the perpetual democracy of the market that, in
turn, controls the allocation of natural and human resources to best supply demand.
The self-interest of individuals is harnessed by market mechanisms to serve the
common good. In Adam Smith’s words:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their
advantages.
Demand is a word used by economists, but it is not a dry monetary term. It is the
expression of desire, the condensation of the needs and wants of many individuals.
It is a psychological variable. Demand is one half of the collective process that
automatically adjusts economic activity throughout the economy. Supply, the col-
lective willingness to provide, is likewise a description of the psychological states
of mind of the complementary agents in acts of trade. In a free market, the meeting
of supply and demand at agreed-upon prices can be thought of as an expression of
liberty and the right to own and trade one’s property. The automatic mechanism of
the market is an invisible hand, an idiom borrowed from Adam Smith, that directs
human affairs to desirable ends.
The Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto,5 argued with the help of mathematical
models borrowed from engineering that an unencumbered free market leads to the
best possible allocation of resources for human needs; that at its optimum, any
change of price will lead to lower net wealth creation and less efﬁcient allocation of
resources. Changes by means of taxation, price ﬁxing or subsidies cause adjust-
ments throughout the system. There will be losers and winners, but the sum of the
losses will be greater than the sum of the gains, as the market is driven away from
the clearing prices that would be agreed upon within an unencumbered free market.
Today, this is known as a Pareto efﬁcient market.6
2Smith, A. (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Strahan and
Cadell, London.
3Mill, J. (1813) Money and Exchange. Edinburgh Review.
4Ricardo, D. (1817) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. John Murray, London.
5Pareto, V. (1909) Cours d'Économie Politique: Nouvelle édition par G.-H. Bousquet et G.
Busino, Librairie Droz, Geneva, 1964, pages 299–345.
6Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., Green, J.R. (1995), “Chapter 16: Equilibrium and its Basic
Welfare Properties”, Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-510268-1.
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These early promises of liberation and optimisation have not stood the test of
time. There are many reasons why free markets do not achieve the optimum results
that had once been hoped for. For example, the Pareto efﬁcient economy does not
necessarily lead to the most just distribution of goods. Remember, the market is a
kind of economic democracy in which we vote by means of the allocation of our
resources. This is not an egalitarian democracy; rich individuals have a greater
impact on the market equilibria than do poor individuals. If buyers or sellers are
monopolies, or co-operating oligopolies, the pricing mechanism does not work
equitably. Furthermore, the necessities of life may force us to allocate resources in
ways we would rather not. We cannot, for example, stop eating because we ﬁnd the
cost of food too high. The opportunities to exploit workers abound, a problem that
is not restricted to the Dickensian era of the British industrial revolution, as the
exploitation of workers today by companies like McDonald’s and Walmart attest.
Jeremy Bentham’s moral imperative, the greatest happiness for the greatest
number, implies that great suffering by a minority may be justiﬁed if it contributes
to greater happiness for a majority. This could be interpreted as a justiﬁcation for
the persecution of minorities. Similarly, Pareto efﬁcient markets are insensitive to
the needs of the poor. Indeed, a Pareto efﬁcient market could exist in which the
majority remains poor while a minority becomes fabulously wealthy. The pursuit of
maximum GDP is not the same as the pursuit of social justice.
Achieving Pareto efﬁciency, irrespective of whether this leads to a just allocation
of resources, presumes that all costs and beneﬁts of economic activity enter into the
pricing mechanism. However, this is not so. Costs and beneﬁts that do not enter into
the pricing mechanism are referred to as externalities.7 External costs are often
imposed upon the commons or are paid for by individuals who gain no beneﬁt from
the goods and services that are produced. When a forest is cut down to make wood
for building houses, the people who purchase the houses pay for the costs incurred
throughout the production chain. These include the cost of paying for the lum-
berjacks who cut down the trees, the transport of logs to saw mills, the milling and
curing of the wood, the transport of wood to wholesale and retail outlets, the
building labour to create the houses, and so on. Other costs, such as cost of energy,
enter into the price of the houses by entering into the pricing mechanism at each
step at which energy is consumed. However, when the denuded hillsides where
forests once stood are no longer available for pleasure, hunting or as habitat for
some species, losses are incurred that have not been paid for in the price of the
houses. Imagine that the hills become eroded and unstable, as a result of which
landslides triggered by heavy rains bury a village in the valley below, and villagers
lose their lives and homes. These damages are also prices paid that do not enter into
the price of the houses that have been built of the wood harvested from those
forests. Likewise, the carbon that was discharged into the atmosphere to supply
energy for the production process contributes to climate change and the con-
comitant costs that this will impose on future generations. These, too, do not enter
7Pigou, A.C. (1920) The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan and Company, London.
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into the price of the houses. Since all economic activity in free markets entails
externalities, we can no longer speak of Pareto efﬁciency as being a meaningful
guide for optimum allocation of resources. Instead, we must acknowledge that we
have created a system that excels in the pillaging of natural resources, the
destruction of nature and the exploitation of certain members of our society. The
invisible hand is blind, but unlike Justice, it is often arbitrary in whom it punishes
and whom it rewards.
There are other ways in which free markets fail. An ideal market is populated by
many independent sellers and buyers, each with perfect knowledge of the market,
and all acting as rational agents seeking their own best advantage. However, this is
not so in the real world. Few people have perfect knowledge of the markets, and
therefore usually make less than optimum choices. Some people make irrational
choices because of psychological failings, such as addictions and unwholesome
habits. In a world that feeds appetites with temptatious advertising, even the most
rational among us occasionally make unwise choices and impulse decisions that we
later regret. We are too easily misled into habits of self-centred consumerism.
Unfortunately, wisdom is not given to all.
Finally, markets fail when the buyers and sellers are no longer concerned with
the utility of the commodities they are trading. By utility, economists mean the
usefulness of the commodities for their intended purpose. When we purchase a
house to live in, we are motivated by the utility of the house. In contrast, when a
speculator purchases a house in anticipation of a future rise in market value, the
utility of the house plays a secondary role in the decision to trade. Speculative trade
leads to market instability. Bubbles form as speculators chase expectations of
capital gains, and busts follow when there is a rush to sell in a falling market. This
is an intractable problem, for there is no way to detect which trades are utilitarian
and which are speculative. It is not possible to legislate against or control specu-
lative trade. A free market, by deﬁnition, must be free for all.
1.1.1 Where Has This Taken Us?
Today, we are destroying the natural environment on an unprecedented scale and at
a rate exceeding any prior biologically-induced change. In 1989, the world passed a
fossil fuel turning point; the quantity of new discoveries of gas, oil and coal
deposits became for the ﬁrst time less than the quantity of these resources con-
sumed. Except for some blips associated with Arctic ﬁnds and fracking shale, and a
temporary levelling of the curve because of the recent recession, the world’s
reserves are running down. Our exploitation of fossil fuels has always been
unsustainable, but now the end is in sight.8
8IEA (2006) World Energy Outlook 2006. Paris and Washington, D.C. Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, International Energy Agency.
4 B.A. Rosen
Contemporary industrial agriculture is unsustainable.9 It is energy-driven at every
phase. Energy is consumed to plough the land, and to apply artiﬁcial fertilizer, which
is itself largely a petroleum product. More energy is used for seeding. And even more
energy is used to apply herbicide, insecticide, and fungicide, and to pump and spray
water in irrigated areas. And yet more energy is used to harvest, in processing,
packaging and transporting food to market. In many places, agriculture is draining
aquifers and salinating the soil. Intense agriculture also destroys soil quality by killing
the natural soil ecology, so that each year greater levels of artiﬁcial inputs are required
to coax a crop from the increasingly dead land. Runoff is despoiling the rivers and
oceans with pollutants, and triggering toxic algal blooms at sea. Use of toxic sprays
bleeds out into the environment, damaging the natural ecology. Desertiﬁcation has
always followed in the footsteps of mankind, but never more so than today. In
summary: Industrial agriculture is consuming large amounts of fossil fuel, putting
carbon in the atmosphere, destroying soil quality and draining aquifers, damaging
natural ecosystems and despoiling rivers and oceans. A recent UN report10 concluded
that the industrial agricultural sector would be bankrupt today if the full cost of food
production were internalized. We are only able to continue with industrial agriculture
because a large part of the cost is placed in the commons. Ultimately, these costs are
being paid elsewhere, or will have to be paid by future generations.
In the argument above, we briefly addressed the building of wooden houses and
industrial agriculture. We must not forget that almost every form of economic
activity imposes costs on the commons. Our children and grandchildren will be
made to pay some of the costs of our food, housing, education, entertainment,
transport and medical care. Indeed, every aspect of our economic lives leaves a trail
of debt behind us. In some cases the debt is paid immediately by people in other
countries; for example, the export of obsolescent consumer electronic devices to
Africa and the Indian subcontinent imposes a burden of pollution in heavy metals
and other toxins on far-away people most of us will never see.
What can be done about this? Can we expect morally responsible behaviour to
occur spontaneously in any society? Adam Smith noted11:
I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.
In 1968, Garrett Hardin described The Tragedy of the Commons12 in a paper on
population. Using an example originally devised by William Foster Lloyd,13 he
9Hilton, S. (2015) More Human: Designing a World Where People Come First. W.H. Allan,
London.
10Hoffmann, U. et al., (2013) Wake Up Before it is too Late: Make Agriculture Truly Sustainable
Now for Food Security in a Changing Climate. Trade and Environment Review. United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development.
11Smith, A. (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Strahan and
Cadell, London.
12Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, volume 162, pages 1243–48.
13Lloyd, W.F. (1833) Two Lectures on the Checks to Population. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
1 Potted Review of Economic Theory: The Complex Evolving System 5
described how a group of farmers competing for use of a shared public resource will
over-exploit and under-invest in the commons. Lloyd’s model illustrates how it is in
the best self-interest of each farmer to extract as much from the commons as
possible, even to the point of over-grazing, for by extraction, the individual gains
100 % of the beneﬁt but only a fraction of the losses that are shared by all farmers
using the commons. Similarly, it is not in the interest of any one farmer to make a
contribution to the commons, since he will pay 100 % of the cost but gain only a
fraction of the beneﬁt, while all others sharing the commons will become
freeloaders on his contribution. It is therefore in the rational best self-interest of
every individual to pillage the resources of the commons without investing in the
preservation or development of same.
The Tragedy of the Commons includes the discharge of pollution: chemicals and
heat into rivers, toxic waste into the air and oceans, rubbish on the streets and in
parks, noise and stink around industrial installations and airports. The polluter gains
100 % of the beneﬁt of being rid of his waste, but suffers only a fraction of the
burden. It is therefore in the rational best self-interest of each individual to dispose
of his waste into the commons without regard for the price paid by others. And
likewise, there is no rational self interest in being the one to do the cleaning up.
The Tragedy of the Commons explains why we inevitably pillage the resources
of the earth and foul our planet with waste, each of us in pursuit of our individual
self-interest. What is in the best individual self-interest when practiced by many is
not in the collective interest to such a degree that individual interests are eventually
smothered. As in the prisoner’s dilemma, we are driven inexorably to suboptimal
outcomes. The logic of the Tragedy of the Commons locks us into a destructive
spiral of such vast proportions that we may eventually destroy much of life on this
planet.
Solutions to this problem can be placed under two broad headings.
• The Dirigeant Option: Retain the public status of the commons, and allocate
permits to exploit the public resources at a level that prevents over-exploitation.
Legislate to attach a price to pollution, ranging from light taxes to criminal
sanctions.
• The Liberal Option: Privatise the commons, knowing that proprietors are
motivated to invest in the development and sustainability of their private
property, and generally do not foul their own nests.
Unfortunately, neither of these options satisfactorily solves the problem:
• The dirigeant option presumes that legislative bodies and executive authorities
are wise, knowledgeable, incorruptible, attentive and well-intentioned. It also
presumes that national authorities have sufﬁcient resources adequately to per-
form their role as custodians of shared common pool resources. None of these
presumptions are true all of the time, often only a few are simultaneously, and in
some cases, none are true at all. Whenever you get government attempting to
regulate business, you get business attempting to regulate government, cor-
rupting it and undermining democracy. In many countries, the oligarchy of big
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business becomes the government. This is one of the principal structural
problems we have today in most of the world.14
• The Liberal option merely pushes the Tragedy of the Commons one step down
the road; the newly privatised entities exploit and pollute the remaining com-
mons. Since it is not possible to privatise everything, the problems remain
unresolved. Furthermore, this solution plays into the hands of the rich and
powerful. The majority remain poor while a minority becomes the inheritors of
the riches of the earth.
• In extreme cases, such as in some African countries today, a combination of the
dirigeant and liberal options jointly fail. This brings about a collapse of capi-
talism and a regression to the robber baron phase, a stage of economic devel-
opment that should have passed into history. The growing wealth-gap in most
developed economies also betrays the presence of this disease in these countries.
In cases in which the actions of one entity damage the property of another, these
damages being externalities with respect to the activity of the parties inflicting the
damage, the usual course of action is to sanction the actions with ﬁnes or other
forms of legislative control. Ronald Coase15 argued that where legal rights to open
access commons and rights to private property come into conflict, spontaneous
local bargaining will occur, leading to internalisation of the costs in the most
efﬁcient possible manner. He illustrated this with an example of a cattle rancher
negotiating with a crop farmer for access to grazing land. Coase showed that the
resolution of disputes that arise when cattle break into farmed land and damage
crops will be determined by the relative proﬁtability of cattle-grazing compared to
farming. The cattle rancher will agree to pay the farmer for access to grazing land
and pay compensation for damages to his crops if the cost is justiﬁed by the value of
the access and grazing. If, however, the crop is more valuable, then the farmer will
demand compensation that the cattle rancher will be unwilling to pay, resulting in a
search for other solutions. The cattle rancher might agree to pay for the fence to
keep his cattle off the farmer’s land if the cost of the fence is less than the com-
pensation that would have to be paid for damaged crops, provided the cost of the
fence did not render cattle ranching unproﬁtable. Coasian bargaining is sensitive to
local conditions, is flexible and can adjust to changing circumstances, and incor-
porates monitoring and sanctions where the participants deem it necessary. Coasian
bargaining achieves an economic efﬁciency that the blunt tool of dirigeant inter-
vention usually cannot.
However, there are three problems with Coasian bargaining. First, the rights of
all parties must be established in law before bargaining can take place. Where no
statutory rights exist, there are no grounds to force the opposing parties to the
bargaining table. We, as people who live in a world increasingly polluted and
degraded by the practices of industry, generally have no legal right to seek redress.
We suffer in an increasingly polluted world. Second, transaction costs are incurred
14Barnes, P. (2006) Capitalism 3.0: A Guide to Reclaiming the Commons. Berrett-Koehler.
15Coase, R.H. (1960) The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics. 3, 1–44.
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in the process of bargaining. These are especially high when one party comprises
many individuals with small marginal interests in the outcome of the bargaining
process. It will not be worth their while to be distracted by the business of bar-
gaining when the matters are of no pressing direct concern and the transaction costs
exceed their individual expected advantage. These bargains will not be made. Class
action suits can help in these cases, but they are in large part not to be relied upon.
Third, there are no parties at the bargaining table for the many species whose
existence is threatened by our industrial activity, nor are there parties to bargain for
such abstractions as ‘pristine nature’. Other parties, such as future generations,
don’t yet exist.
Elinor Ostrom has studied how communities succeed or fail at managing ﬁnite
open common pool resources such as grazing land, forests, irrigation waters and
ﬁsheries. Research shows that local groups closely linked to the resources in question
are often capable of sustainable management and efﬁcient extraction of the products of
the commons. In many cases, management is more efﬁciently organised locally than if
rules and infrastructure were to be imposed by external authorities to manage the
commons.16 Ostrom’s work shows that the economic model of humans as norm-free
myopically short term operators with perfect knowledge of market conditions, focused
exclusively on maximizing their individual net worth in monetary terms, is not an
adequate model of the complex adaptive systems that comprise real world commu-
nities. People are limited in their knowledge, are not wholly rational in their
decision-making, are constrained in their choices by cultural factors, are aware of and
strongly influenced by social factors such as reputation, and are rarely free of ethical
and moral views that may dominate their decision-making. Furthermore, the rule-
making that results in sustainable management of the commons is more like an
ongoing dialogue between all entities (individual, corporate and government) evoking
an experimental chaotic process that, under the right conditions, will move towards
sustainable and efﬁcient management of the commons.
Ostrom’s experimental laboratory work showed that players of investment
games that incorporated the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma, when given the
opportunity to discuss strategy in face to face meetings between each iteration,
tended to regulate their behavior and win group results that approached the opti-
mum. This held even when the behavior of individual players was not revealed to
the other players.17 This robust ﬁnding shows that public shaming did not play a
role in regulating behavior, but rather some internalized sense of group morality
constrained individual behavior, leading to positive group results. In other exper-
iments in which players did not enjoy anonymity and were able to devise agreed
upon schedules of sanctions against players who broke ranks to obtain unfair
shares, up to 95 % of the optimum group yield was achieved by co-operative play.
16Ostrom, E. (1999) Coping with Tragedies of the Commons. Annual Reviews of Political Science.
2: 493–535.
17Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and Walker, J.M. (1994) Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
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Ostrom concluded that players used complex heuristics, not game theoretical
calculations, to determine their actions. When players are able to meet and agree on
strategy, and when given the opportunity to devise their own rules for sanctioning
rule breakers in games in which players are not protected by anonymity, they
spontaneously regulated their individual behavior so that collective results
approached optimum outcomes.18 Players tended to react with great indignation
against rule breakers, to such a degree that some individuals were willing to impose
sanctions on rule breakers at considerable personal cost, occasionally surpassing the
loss imposed by the rule breaking, demonstrating that inherent non-rational psy-
chological factors play a role in these behaviors.
Many instances of local community-based initiatives to take control of open
common resources and manage them sustainably have been studied and documented.
Reviewing these, Ostrom delineated a set of eight conditions that predict success.19 In
order to ensure sustainable management of the commons, stakeholders should ensure
the following:
1. Deﬁne clear group boundaries to membership. Increasing the proportion of
participants who are well known in a community, and who have a long term
stake and reputations of trustworthiness to protect in that community enhances
the likelihood that optimal reciprocal behavior will be observed.
2. Match rules governing use of common resources to local needs and conditions.
The rules may specify harvesting caps, seasonal restrictions, limitations on the
technology used, time of access, and so on. The rules must be seen to be fair.
3. Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in making and modifying
the rules. Research shows that locals are better at specifying rules that actually
work. Local groups should be empowered to experiment with rules, which is
important for maintaining the effectiveness of the adaptive and continually
evolving system. If complex ecological calculations to ﬁnd carrying capacity are
required, for example, it is better to educate the locals than to impose quotas
with an authoritarian hand. The latter may lead to rule-breaking and local forces
implicitly approving of the rule-breaking.
4. The rule-making rights of community members must be respected by outside
authorities. Interference by well-meaning but more distant authorities can break
the system. Devolution of authority and explicit support of local
decision-making enhances the system.
5. Develop a system carried out by community members for monitoring members’
behavior. Informal monitoring among peers will occur spontaneously, but
giving it a formal structure will improve the efﬁciency and adherence to the
rules. Permit community members to tinker with the monitoring system to
enhance its effectiveness and efﬁciency.
18Ostrom, E. (1998) A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action.
American Political Science Reviews. 92(1): 1–22.
19http://www.onthecommons.org/magazine/elinor-ostroms-8-principles-managing-commmons 24
May, 2015.
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6. Use graduated sanctions for rule violators. Some participants will test the system
by breaking the rules and will adjust their behaviour on the basis of the response.
Severe sanctions for ﬁrst offenders can lead to ill-will and can break the system.
7. Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution. Ensure that higher
authorities and avenues of appeal that exist will respect the local decision-making
process. Bullying, corruption and political biases can occur at any level. Dispute
resolution should be based on clear explicit delineation of rights, by which Coasian
bargaining becomes part of the backbone of the system.
8. Build responsibility for governing the common resources in nested tiers from the
lowest level up through the entire interconnected system. Keep in mind that the
system will be a complex adaptive system that must be able to evolve as conditions
change. Evolution of the system should come from the ground up. As far as
possible, power should devolve to the lowest possible level, with higher authorities
taking educational or mentoring roles in preference to judicial or legislative roles.
We have already noted that human behaviour is not always rational in the way
presumed in classical economics. The term ‘spite’ is used in sociobiology to refer to
behaviour that results in greater damage to the spiteful individual than the damage
arising from the rule-breaking behaviour of the offending party. How can we
explain this behaviour? Similarly, self-sacriﬁcial heroism requires explanation.
What does it gain a man to lose his life in battle for the beneﬁt of his fellow
warriors? Both spite and heroism can be explained by showing that the loss to the
spiteful or heroic individual is more than compensated for by gains among
within-group members. Evolution of instincts that drive spiteful and heroic
behavior may arise from mechanisms of group selection or of kin selection; not all
sociobiologists are in agreement regarding the mechanisms, but all agree that the
sum of the gains to within-group individuals in the long term must be greater than
the individual losses. This collective non-zero sum drives the evolution of instincts
for both spiteful and heroic behaviour. These behaviours are therefore not as
irrational as they may appear at ﬁrst glance. They demonstrate that human beha-
viour is not solely self-interested in the way classical economists posited.
There appear to be other reasons why behavior is not norm-free myopically short
term resource-maximizing strategic play. Most of the highest quality software is
open source and free to use. The Internet, for example, runs on a backbone of UNIX
that is not proprietary. The open source world is populated by highly talented
programmers operating in an informal association, who contribute their time and
expertise to the commons with no expectation of direct ﬁnancial reward. Many of
these programmers could earn six digit incomes, which they may forego in order to
work on their open source projects. Why? Once again, we must turn to psycho-
logical and socio-biological theories to explain this.
The community of open source programmers is held together by their expertise
and shared understandings.20 You cannot fake your skill in this community; skilled
20Raymond, E.S. (2001) The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an
Accidental Revolutionary. O'Reilly Media.
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programmers can read code as most of us read novels. Excellence is widely under-
stood and appreciated, and uncommon cleverness is greatly admired. Talented
members of the open source community can win the approbation of their peers for
their contributions. This is what they work for. It has been argued that this is the
ultimate reward for which we all strive. Why make money, we may ask, except that
we may use it to purchase expensive cars and luxury homes that serve to advertise our
success. Such symbols of material success win us the approbation of our peers in the
entrepreneurial and corporate world. Money is a means to these ends. A talented
programmer can skip the money and go directly to the recognition and status that his
skills earn. Money merely gets in the way. The result is a spontaneous self-organizing
system that arises from the bottom up and manages the many projects in the col-
lective open source enterprise. The open source world is free of the administrative
command structures that characterise the corporate world of commercial software,
resulting in a more efﬁcient self-regulating, organically-growing community com-
prising many of the world’s most talented coders.21
Sociobiologists argue that the ultimate reward is access to fecund partners and
greater reproductive success. It matters not whether this is achieved by acquiring
money, fast cars and great estates, or by winning honor and influence in
non-monetary ways. If this is so, then the fundamental basis of economic theory is
mistaken. Perhaps this explains why a great part, perhaps the greater part, of human
endeavor takes place outside the realm of the money economy; the investment that
couples make in each other and their offspring is the most obvious example. But is
this all there is to being human? Are we just chasing reproductive success, driven
by selﬁsh genes that care not what our individual losses may be?22
Computer models can be constructed to demonstrate the phenomenon of emer-
gence.23 By this we refer to properties of systems that do not appear to be properties of
the parts. A widely cited example is found in computer models of ant behavior. These
models can be written with a small number of rules for each ant. These rules do not
enable any solitary ant to behave in a complex purposeful way. In some models, the
solitary ant engages in a random walk until it dies of starvation. However, when many
ants are placed together in the virtual space created by the program, seemingly
intelligent and purposeful behavior emerges from the interactions between them.
Behavioral scientists studying behavior in insects and other species concur that
emergent phenomena are necessary to explain complex chaotic self-organizing col-
lective behavior that is observed in nature. Can we extend the concept of emergence to
human social behavior? Certainly, although it would be rash to claim that we know
what the emergent behaviors are or how to distinguish them from other aspects of
human behavior. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the rules encoded into our nervous
21Steele, R.D. (2012) The Open-Source Everything Manifesto: Transparency, Truth, and Trust.
Manifesto Series, Evolver Editions.
22Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selﬁsh Gene. Oxford University Press.
23Johnson, S. (2002) Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software.
Scribner.
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systems bring about new dimensions of emergent behaviors that transcend those
predicted by economic and evolutionary laws of nature. Some people argue that the
moral dimensions of human behavior are emergent. The spiritual, we are told, is the
component that makes the whole something greater than the sum of the parts.
What about the ethical foundations of corporate capitalism?. We all know that the
most magniﬁcent and inspirational mission statements hide many sins. The charter of
Enron was exemplary, yet this company gave us one of the most egregious examples
of rapacious corporate predation and criminality of the last century.24 More generally,
the advertising industry has fostered a culture of image-creation tantamount to sys-
tematic lying, and rendered it ordinary, acceptable, desirable even. Public awareness,
itself another aspect of the commons, is corrupted and exploited in the interests of
corporate greed. Can international corporations ever possess the emotions of guilt or of
pride that may drive moral behavior in individuals? Some argue that a culture of
corporate responsibility can arise if senior management sets the standards from the
outset.25 However, many believe not, and in noting this, we can make a distinction
between ‘free enterprise’ that guarantees rights of individuals and ‘corporate capital-
ism’ that has evolved into a global device for exploiting these rights.26 The system has
become the birthplace of monsters enriching themselves while destroying the planet
and undermining a just and equitable society.27 It should be cause for alarm to note
that none of the mechanisms described by Ostrom operate at the corporate scale.
Perhaps it is helpful to quote once again from Adam Smith, the father of economics
whose prescient insights were ﬁlled with hope and optimism, but also with foreboding
and warnings that we seem to have ignored for too long28:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.
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